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INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP 
 
 CHAPTER 6 (2d ed) 
RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION 
 
ALLIED TUBE & CONDUIT CORP. V. INDIAN HEAD, INC. 
486 U.S. 492 (1988) 
 
BRENNAN, J., delivered the opinion of the Court: 
 
Petitioner contends that its efforts to affect the product standard-
setting process of a private association are immune from antitrust liability 
under the Noerr doctrine primarily because the association's standards are 
widely adopted into law by state and local governments. Eastern Railroad 
Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) 
(“Noerr”). The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that Noerr immunity did not apply. We affirm. 
 
The National Fire Protection Association (“Association”) is a 
private, voluntary organization with more than 31,500 individual and group 
members representing industry, labor, academia, insurers, organized 
medicine, firefighters, and government. The Association, among other 
things, publishes product standards and codes related to fire protection 
through a process known as “consensus standard making.” One of the codes 
it publishes is the National Electrical Code (“Code”), which establishes 
product and performance requirements for the design and installation of 
electrical wiring systems. Revised every three years, the Code is the most 
influential electrical code in the nation. A substantial number of state and 
local governments routinely adopt the Code into law with little or no 
change; private certification laboratories, such as Underwriters 
Laboratories, normally will not list and label an electrical product that does 
not meet Code standards; many underwriters will refuse to insure structures 
that are not built in conformity with the Code; and many electrical 
inspectors, contractors, and distributors will not use a product that falls 
outside the Code. 
 
Among the electrical products covered by the Code is electrical 
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conduit, the hollow tubing used as a raceway to carry electrical wires 
through the walls and floors of buildings. Throughout the relevant period, 
the Code permitted using electrical conduit made of steel, and almost all 
conduit sold was in fact steel conduit. Starting in 1980, respondent began to 
offer plastic conduit made of polyvinyl chloride. Respondent claims its 
plastic conduit offers significant competitive advantages over steel conduit, 
including pliability, lower installed cost, and lower susceptibility to short 
circuiting. In 1980, however, there was also a scientific basis for concern 
that, during fires in high-rise buildings, polyvinyl chloride conduit might 
burn and emit toxic fumes. 
 
Respondent initiated a proposal to include polyvinyl chloride 
conduit as an approved type of electrical conduit in the 1981 edition of the 
Code. Following approval by one of the Association's professional panels, 
this proposal was scheduled for consideration at the 1980 annual meeting, 
where it could be adopted or rejected by a simple majority of the members 
present. Alarmed that, if approved, respondent's product might pose a 
competitive threat to steel conduit, petitioner, the Nation's largest producer 
of steel conduit, met to plan strategy with, among others, members of the 
steel industry, other steel conduit manufacturers, and its independent sales 
agents. They collectively agreed to exclude respondent's product from the 
1981 Code by packing the upcoming annual meeting with new Association 
members whose only function would be to vote against the polyvinyl 
chloride proposal. 
 
Combined, the steel interests recruited 230 persons to join the 
Association and to attend the annual meeting to vote against the proposal. 
Petitioner alone recruited 155 persons-including employees, executives, 
sales agents, the agents' employees, employees from two divisions that did 
not sell electrical products, and the wife of a national sales director. 
Petitioner and the other steel interests also paid over $100,000 for the 
membership, registration, and attendance expenses of these voters. At the 
annual meeting, the steel group voters were instructed where to sit and how 
and when to vote by group leaders who used walkie-talkies and hand 
signals to facilitate communication. Few of the steel group voters had any 
of the technical documentation necessary to follow the meeting. None of 
them spoke at the meeting to give their reasons for opposing the proposal to 
approve polyvinyl chloride conduit. Nonetheless, with their solid vote in 
opposition, the proposal was rejected and returned to committee by a vote 
of 394 to 390. Respondent appealed the membership's vote to the 
Association's Board of Directors, but the Board denied the appeal on the 
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ground that, although the Association's rules had been circumvented, they 
had not been violated. 
 
In October 1981, respondent brought this suit in Federal District 
Court, alleging that petitioner and others had unreasonably restrained trade 
in the electrical conduit market in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 26 
Stat. 209, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 1. A bifurcated jury trial began in March 
1985. Petitioner conceded that it had conspired with the other steel interests 
to exclude respondent's product from the Code and that it had a pecuniary 
interest to do so. The jury, instructed under the rule of reason that 
respondent carried the burden of showing that the anticompetitive effects of 
petitioner's actions outweighed any procompetitive benefits of standard 
setting, found petitioner liable. In answers to special interrogatories, the jury 
found that petitioner did not violate any rules of the Association and acted, 
at least in part, based on a genuine belief that plastic conduit was unsafe, 
but that petitioner nonetheless did “subvert” the consensus standard-making 
process of the Association. The jury also made special findings that 
petitioner's actions had an adverse impact on competition, were not the least 
restrictive means of expressing petitioner's opposition to the use of 
polyvinyl chloride conduit in the marketplace, and unreasonably restrained 
trade in violation of the antitrust laws. The jury then awarded respondent 
damages, to be trebled, of $3.8 million for lost profits resulting from the 
effect that excluding polyvinyl chloride conduit from the 1981 Code had of 
its own force in the marketplace. No damages were awarded for injuries 
stemming from the adoption of the 1981 Code by governmental entities. 
 
The District Court then granted a judgment n.o.v. for petitioner, 
reasoning that Noerr immunity applied because the Association was “akin 
to a legislature” and because petitioner, “by the use of methods consistent 
with acceptable standards of political action, genuinely intended to 
influence the [Association] with respect to the National Electrical Code, and 
to thereby influence the various state and local legislative bodies which 
adopt the [Code].” App. to Pet. for  Cert. 28a, 30a. The Court of Appeals 
reversed, rejecting both the argument that the Association should be treated 
as a “quasi-legislative” body because legislatures routinely adopt the Code 
and the argument that efforts to influence the Code were immune under 
Noerr as indirect attempts to influence state and local governments. Indian 
Head, Inc. v. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp., 817 F.2d 938 (2d Cir. 1987) 
aff'd, 486 U.S. 492 (1988). We granted certiorari to address important issues 
regarding the application of Noerr immunity to private standard-setting 
associations. 
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Concerted efforts to restrain or monopolize trade by petitioning 
government officials are protected from antitrust liability under the doctrine 
established by Noerr; Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669-672 
(1965); and California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 
U.S. 508 (1972). The scope of this protection depends, however, on the 
source, context, and nature of the anticompetitive restraint at issue. 
“[W]here a restraint upon trade or monopolization is the result of valid 
governmental action, as opposed to private action,” those urging the 
governmental action enjoy absolute immunity from antitrust liability for the 
anticompetitive restraint. Noerr, 365 U.S., at 136; see also Pennington, 
supra, 381 U.S. at 671. In addition, where, independent of any government 
action, the anticompetitive restraint results directly from private action, the 
restraint cannot form the basis for antitrust liability if it is “incidental” to a 
valid effort to influence governmental action. Noerr, supra, 365 U.S. at 143. 
The validity of such efforts, and thus the applicability of Noerr immunity, 
varies with the context and nature of the activity. A publicity campaign 
directed at the general public, seeking legislation or executive action, enjoys 
antitrust immunity even when the campaign employs unethical and 
deceptive methods.. But in less political arenas, unethical and deceptive 
practices can constitute abuses of administrative or judicial processes that 
may result in antitrust violations. 
 
In this case, the restraint of trade on which liability was predicated 
was the Association's exclusion of respondent's product from the Code, and 
no damages were imposed for the incorporation of that Code by any 
government. The relevant context is thus the standard-setting process of a 
private association. Typically, private standard-setting associations, like the 
Association in this case, include members having horizontal and vertical 
business relations. See generally 7 P. Areeda, Antitrust Law ¶ 1477, p. 343 
(1986) (trade and standard-setting associations routinely treated as 
continuing conspiracies of their members). There is no doubt that the 
members of such associations often have economic incentives to restrain 
competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a 
serious potential for anticompetitive harm.FN5 See American Society of 
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 571 (1982). 
Agreement on a product standard is, after all, implicitly an agreement not to 
manufacture, distribute, or purchase certain types of products. Accordingly, 
private standard-setting associations have traditionally been objects of 
antitrust scrutiny. See, e.g., ibid.; Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas 
Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam). When, however, 
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private associations promulgate safety standards based on the merits of 
objective expert judgments and through procedures that prevent the 
standard-setting process from being biased by members with economic 
interests in stifling product competition, cf. Hydrolevel, supra, 456 U.S., at 
570-73 (noting absence of “meaningful safeguards”), those private 
standards can have significant procompetitive advantages. It is this potential 
for procompetitive benefits that has led most lower courts to apply rule-of-
reason analysis to product standard-setting by private associations. 
 
Given this context, petitioner does not enjoy the immunity accorded 
those who merely urge the government to restrain trade. We agree with the 
Court of Appeals that the Association cannot be treated as a “quasi-
legislative” body simply because legislatures routinely adopt the Code the 
Association publishes. Whatever de facto authority the Association enjoys, 
no official authority has been conferred on it by any government, and the 
decisionmaking body of the Association is composed, at least in part, of 
persons with economic incentives to restrain trade. See Continental Ore Co. 
v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707-708 (1962). “We 
may presume, absent a showing to the contrary, that [a government] acts in 
the public interest. A private party, on the other hand, may be presumed to 
be acting primarily on his or its own behalf.” Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 
34 (1985). The dividing line between restraints resulting from governmental 
action and those resulting from private action may not always be obvious. 
But where, as here, the restraint is imposed by persons unaccountable to the 
public and without official authority, many of whom have personal financial 
interests in restraining competition, we have no difficulty concluding that 
the restraint has resulted from private action. 
 
Noerr immunity might still apply, however, if, as petitioner argues, 
the exclusion of polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code, and the effect 
that exclusion had of its own force in the marketplace, were incidental to a 
valid effort to influence governmental action. Petitioner notes that the lion's 
share of the anticompetitive effect in this case came from the predictable 
adoption of the Code into law by a large number of state and local 
governments. See Indian Head, Inc., 817 F.2d at 939, n. 1. Indeed, 
petitioner argues that, because state and local governments rely so heavily 
on the Code and lack the resources or technical expertise to second-guess it, 
efforts to influence the Association's standard-setting process are the most 
effective means of influencing legislation regulating electrical conduit. This 
claim to Noerr immunity has some force. The effort to influence 
governmental action in this case certainly cannot be characterized as a sham 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                 Chapter 6, Page 7 
Hovenkamp                                                                                                      Dec. 2012 
 
given the actual adoption of the 1981 Code into a number of statutes and 
local ordinances. Nor can we quarrel with petitioner's contention that, given 
the widespread adoption of the Code into law, any effect the 1981 Code had 
in the marketplace of its own force was, in the main, incidental to 
petitioner's genuine effort to influence governmental action. And, as 
petitioner persuasively argues, the claim of Noerr immunity cannot be 
dismissed on the ground that the conduct at issue involved no “direct” 
petitioning of government officials, for Noerr itself immunized a form of 
“indirect” petitioning. See Noerr (immunizing a publicity campaign directed 
at the general public on the ground that it was part of an effort to influence 
legislative and executive action). 
 
Nonetheless, the validity of petitioner's actions remains an issue. We 
cannot agree with petitioner's absolutist position that the Noerr doctrine 
immunizes every concerted effort that is genuinely intended to influence 
governmental action. If all such conduct were immunized then, for example, 
competitors would be free to enter into horizontal price agreements as long 
as they wished to propose that price as an appropriate level for 
governmental ratemaking or price supports.  Horizontal conspiracies or 
boycotts designed to exact higher prices or other economic advantages from 
the government would be immunized on the ground that they are genuinely 
intended to influence the government to agree to the conspirators' terms. 
Firms could claim immunity for boycotts or horizontal output restrictions 
on the ground that they are intended to dramatize the plight of their industry 
and spur legislative action. Immunity might even be claimed for 
anticompetitive mergers on the theory that they give the merging 
corporations added political clout. Nor is it necessarily dispositive that 
packing the Association's meeting may have been the most effective means 
of securing government action, for one could imagine situations where the 
most effective means of influencing government officials is bribery, and we 
have never suggested that that kind of attempt to influence the government 
merits protection. We thus conclude that the Noerr immunity of 
anticompetitive activity intended to influence the government depends not 
only on its impact, but also on the context and nature of the activity. 
 
Here petitioner's actions took place within the context of the 
standard-setting process of a private association. Having concluded that the 
Association is not a “quasi-legislative” body, we reject petitioner's 
argument that any efforts to influence the Association must be treated as 
efforts to influence a “quasi-legislature” and given the same wide berth 
accorded legislative lobbying. That rounding up supporters is an acceptable 
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and constitutionally protected method of influencing elections does not 
mean that rounding up economically interested persons to set private 
standards must also be protected. Nor do we agree with petitioner's 
contention that, regardless of the Association's nonlegislative status, the 
effort to influence the Code should receive the same wide latitude given 
ethically dubious efforts to influence legislative action in the political arena, 
see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 140-41, simply because the ultimate aim of the effort 
to influence the private standard-setting process was (principally) legislative 
action. The ultimate aim is not dispositive. A misrepresentation to a court 
would not necessarily be entitled to the same antitrust immunity allowed 
deceptive practices in the political arena simply because the odds were very 
good that the court's decision would be codified-nor for that matter would 
misrepresentations made under oath at a legislative committee hearing in 
the hopes of spurring legislative action. 
 
What distinguishes this case from Noerr and its progeny is that the 
context and nature of petitioner's activity make it the type of commercial 
activity that has traditionally had its validity determined by the antitrust 
laws themselves. True, in Noerr we immunized conduct that could be 
characterized as a conspiracy among railroads to destroy business relations 
between truckers and their customers. Noerr, supra, 365 U.S. at 142. But 
we noted there: 
 
“There are no specific findings that the railroads attempted 
directly to persuade anyone not to deal with the truckers. Moreover, 
all the evidence in the record, both oral and documentary, deals with 
the railroads' efforts to influence the passage and enforcement of 
laws. Circulars, speeches, newspaper articles, editorials, magazine 
articles, memoranda and all other documents discuss in one way or 
another the railroads' charges that heavy trucks injure the roads, 
violate the laws and create traffic hazards, and urge that truckers 
should be forced to pay a fair share of the costs of rebuilding the 
roads, that they should be compelled to obey the laws, and that 
limits should be placed upon the weight of the loads they are 
permitted to carry.”  
 
In light of those findings, we characterized the railroads' activity as a 
classic “attempt ... to influence legislation by a campaign of publicity,” an 
“inevitable” and “incidental” effect of which was “the infliction of some 
direct injury upon the interests of the party against whom the campaign is 
directed.”  The essential character of such a publicity campaign was, we 
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concluded, political, and could not be segregated from the activity's impact 
on business. Rather, the plaintiff's cause of action simply embraced the 
inherent possibility in such political fights “that one group or the other will 
get hurt by the arguments that are made.” Id. at 144. As a political activity, 
special factors counseled against regulating the publicity campaign under 
the antitrust laws: 
 
“Insofar as [the Sherman] Act sets up a code of ethics at all, it is 
a code that condemns trade restraints, not political activity, and, as 
we have already pointed out, a publicity campaign to influence 
governmental action falls clearly into the category of political 
activity. The proscriptions of the Act, tailored as they are for the 
business world, are not at all appropriate for application in the 
political arena. Congress has traditionally exercised extreme caution 
in legislating with respect to problems relating to the conduct of 
political activities, a caution which has been reflected in the 
decisions of this Court interpreting such legislation. All of this 
caution would go for naught if we permitted an extension of the 
Sherman Act to regulate activities of that nature simply because 
those activities have a commercial impact and involve conduct that 
can be termed unethical.” 
 
In Noerr, then, the political context and nature of the activity precluded 
inquiry into its antitrust validity. 
 
Here the context and nature of the activity do not counsel against 
inquiry into its validity. Unlike the publicity campaign in Noerr, the activity 
at issue here did not take place in the open political arena, where 
partisanship is the hallmark of decisionmaking, but within the confines of a 
private standard-setting process. The validity of conduct within that process 
has long been defined and circumscribed by the antitrust laws without 
regard to whether the private standards are likely to be adopted into law. 
Indeed, because private standard-setting by associations comprising firms 
with horizontal and vertical business relations is permitted at all under the 
antitrust laws only on the understanding that it will be conducted in a 
nonpartisan manner offering procompetitive benefits, see ibid., the 
standards of conduct in this context are, at least in some respects, more 
rigorous than the standards of conduct prevailing in the partisan political 
arena or in the adversarial process of adjudication. The activity at issue here 
thus cannot, as in Noerr, be characterized as an activity that has 
traditionally been regulated with extreme caution, see Noerr, 365 U.S. at 
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141, or as an activity that “bear[s] little if any resemblance to the 
combinations normally held violative of the Sherman Act.” And petitioner 
did not confine itself to efforts to persuade an independent decisionmaker, 
cf. Id., at 138, 139 (describing the immunized conduct as “mere 
solicitation”); rather, it organized and orchestrated the actual exercise of the 
Association's decisionmaking authority in setting a standard. Nor can the 
setting of the Association's Code be characterized as merely an exercise of 
the power of persuasion, for it in part involves the exercise of market 
power. The Association's members, after all, include consumers, 
distributors, and manufacturers of electrical conduit, and any agreement to 
exclude polyvinyl chloride conduit from the Code is in part an implicit 
agreement not to trade in that type of electrical conduit. Although one could 
reason backwards from the legislative impact of the Code to the conclusion 
that the conduct at issue here is “political,” we think that, given the context 
and nature of the conduct, it can more aptly be characterized as commercial 
activity with a political impact. Just as the antitrust laws should not regulate 
political activities “simply because those activities have a commercial 
impact,” Id. at 141, so the antitrust laws should not necessarily immunize 
what are in essence commercial activities simply because they have a 
political impact….. 
 
Thus in this case the context and nature of petitioner's efforts to 
influence the Code persuade us that the validity of those efforts must, 
despite their political impact, be evaluated under the standards of conduct 
set forth by the antitrust laws that govern the private standard-setting 
process. The antitrust validity of these efforts is not established, without 
more, by petitioner's literal compliance with the rules of the Association, for 
the hope of procompetitive benefits depends upon the existence of 
safeguards sufficient to prevent the standard-setting process from being 
biased by members with economic interests in restraining competition. An 
association cannot validate the anticompetitive activities of its members 
simply by adopting rules that fail to provide such safeguards. The issue of 
immunity in this case thus collapses into the issue of antitrust liability. 
Although we do not here set forth the rules of antitrust liability governing 
the private standard-setting process, we hold that at least where, as here, an 
economically interested party exercises decision-making authority in 
formulating a product standard for a private association that comprises 
market participants, that party enjoys no Noerr immunity from any antitrust 
liability flowing from the effect the standard has of its own force in the 
marketplace. 
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This conclusion does not deprive state and local governments of input 
and information from interested individuals or organizations or leave 
petitioner without ample means to petition those governments.  Petitioner, 
and others concerned about the safety or competitive threat of polyvinyl 
chloride conduit, can, with full antitrust immunity, engage in concerted 
efforts to influence those governments through direct lobbying, publicity 
campaigns, and other traditional avenues of political expression. To the 
extent state and local governments are more difficult to persuade through 
these other avenues, that no doubt reflects their preference for and 
confidence in the nonpartisan consensus process that petitioner has 
undermined. Petitioner remains free to take advantage of the forum 
provided by the standard-setting process by presenting and vigorously 
arguing accurate scientific evidence before a nonpartisan private standard-
setting body. And petitioner can avoid the strictures of the private standard-
setting process by attempting to influence legislatures through other forums. 
What petitioner may not do (without exposing itself to possible antitrust 
liability for direct injuries) is bias the process by, as in this case, stacking 
the private standard-setting body with decisionmakers sharing their 
economic interest in restraining competition. 
 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
 
Affirmed. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  Private standard setting is often socially beneficial.  It can improve 
product quality, increase compatibility or interoperability, or reduce costs 
by permitting larger output of a common product, thereby creating 
economies of scale. Herbert Hovenkamp, Standards Ownership and 
Competition Policy, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 87, 90 (2007) However, private 
standard setting can facilitate collusion and exclusion.  Collusion most 
typically occurs when standards are created or enforced by competing 
producers. Exclusion occurs when standards are used to keep some 
producers out of the market. These possibilities make it important to 
identify circumstances where standards are used anticompetitively. 
 
2.  In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 
(1961), the Supreme Court sustained a complaint that the defendants, a 
group of heater manufacturers, gas utilities, and insurance companies, 
excluded the plaintiff’s heater design because it was dangerous.  The 
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plaintiff alleged that the exclusion was simply a conspiracy to get the 
plaintiff’s heater off the market.  That might be a perfectly good explanation 
why competing heater manufacturers would want to exclude the plaintiff’s 
heater.  But what must have motivated natural gas utilities and fire 
insurance companies, who also allegedly participated in the exclusionary 
decision? 
3.  Today it is widely believed that innovation contributes far more to 
economic growth than the simple movement of markets toward greater 
competitiveness under constant technology.  See, e.g., Robert M. Solow, 
Technial Change and the Aggregate Producton Function, 3 
REV.ECON.STAT. 312 (1957); Robert M. Solow, A Contribution to the 
Theory of Economic Growth, 70 Q.J.ECON. 65 (1956); Trevor W. Swan, 
Economic Growth and Capital Accumlation, 32 ECON.REC. 334 (1956).  If 
that it so, then it is also likely that a practice that restrains innovation can do 
much more harm to the economy than a practice that simply maintains 
prices at higher than the competitive level.  Does this mean that antitrust 
authorities should be spending relatively more time pursuing innovation 
restraints? As the Kloth case, reprinted infra, indicates, problems of proving 
causation and harm are significant. 
 
NOTE: 
MERGERS AND RESTRAINTS ON INNOVATION 
 
The most commonly given reason that the antitrust laws condemn 
mergers as anticompetitive is that they threaten higher prices in some 
market, either by permitting market wide collusion or by permitting a firm 
to raise its own prices “unilaterally” by eliminating a fairly close rival.  
Merger Guidelines issued by the Department of Justice Antitrust Division 
and the Federal Trade Commission in 2010 describe the theories and 
techniques that these government agencies will use to challenge mergers as 
anticompetitive under the antitrust laws (§ 7 of the Clayton Act, but also 
occasionally §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act).   
The 2010 Guidelines include a separate section on mergers limiting 
“innovation and product variety.”  Guidelines, §6.4 which is concerned with 
“unilateral effects arising from diminished innovation or reduced product 
variety.”  As the Guidelines state: 
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The [enforcement] Agencies may consider whether a merger is 
likely to diminish innovation competition by encouraging the 
merged firm to curtail its innovative efforts below the level that 
would prevail in the absence of the merger. That curtailment of 
innovation could take the form of reduced incentive to continue 
with an existing product-development effort or reduced incentive to 
initiate development of new products. 
The first of these effects is most likely to occur if at least 
one of the merging firms is engaging in efforts to introduce new 
products that would capture substantial revenues from the other 
merging firm. The second effect, which would be felt over the 
longer run, is most likely to occur if at least one of the merging 
firms has capabilities that are likely to lead it to develop new 
products in the future that would capture substantial revenues from 
the other merging firm. The Agencies therefore also consider 
whether a merger will diminish innovation competition by 
combining two of a very small number of firms with the strongest 
capabilities to innovate in a specific direction. 
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.html 
 
The concern is hardly fanciful and has been known since the beginning 
of the twentieth century.  For example, in the Paper Bag patent litigation, 
which reached the Supreme Court in 1908, the dominant firm had acquired 
a patent in a technology that competed with technology it was already 
using.  It did not use the patent at all, preferring to stick with its existing 
technology, but also refused to license it to others and filed a successful 
infringement action against a rival firm that developed technology that 
infringed the acquired patent.  The case is reprinted in Chapter Eight.  See 
also Herbert Hovenkamp, Harm to Competition Under the 2010 Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines, 39 REV. INDUS.ORG. 3 (2011). 
 
The 2010 Merger Guidelines seem to be giving the nod to the Arrow 
side of  the Schumpeter-Arrow “debate” over the relationship between 
innovation and market structure.  Joseph Schumpeter famously argued in 
the 1940s that monopolists had a far greater incentive to innovate than 
competitors; only monopolists had the resources and they were in bar far 
the best position to capture the returns from innovation.  Further, dominant 
firms typically have a “head start” in innovation that makes it more likely 
that they will capture the returns.  See JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, 
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CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY (1942), particularly chapter 7, on 
“The Process of Creative Destruction.” 
 
In sharp contrast, Kenneth Arrow argued that greater competition is in 
fact more conducive to innovation.  Monopolists tend to become heavily 
invested in their technology and will willingly innovate along the same 
technological path by building on what they have.  But outside firms have a 
much greater interest in truly innovative technologies that will upend the 
dominant firm’s market position.  That is, smaller rivals have every 
incentive to innovate more radically.    Further, the monopolist is already 
earning monopoly returns, while small rivals are earning only the 
competitive return, so they have much more to gain.  Further, a competitor 
has everything to lose if a different competitor innovates.   See Kenneth J. 
Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in 
ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF RISK-BEARING 144, 157 (3d ed. 1976) (1962).  
See also TIM WU, THE MASTER SWITCH: THE RISE AND FALL OF 
INFORMATION EMPIRES (2010), which details how over the history of 
telecommunications and related technologies most of the truly radical 
innovations have come from outsiders who often upended entrenched 
dominant firms; see also Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust 
Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (2012) 
 
Today the general consensus is that the truth lies between the two 
positions articulated by Schumpeter and Arrow, and that the relationship 
between innovation and market structure is an inverted “U” shaped curve.  
That is, monopolists have less than optimal incentives to innovate, but so do 
the firms in highly competitive markets.  Most of the innovation occurs in 
markets that are moderately concentrated (say, 4-10 firms). See CHRISTINA 
BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT RESTRAINT: 
PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION, Ch. 1 (2011); Jonathan 
Baker, Beyond Schumpeter and Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters Innovation, 
74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 586 (2007).  For other arguments that innovation 
policy must take antitrust-like considerations more into account, including 
evaluations of market structure, see Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: 
Antitrust Enforcement if Innovation Mattered Most, 78 Antitrust L.J. 313 
(2012); Mark A. Lemley, Industry-Specific Antitrust Policy for Innovation, 
2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 637, 637 (2011 Milton Handler Lecture). 
 
In Free FreeHand Corp. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 852 F.Supp.2d 1171 
(N.D.Cal. 2012), the court sustained a complaint that Adobe, a leading 
manufacturer of commercial graphic illustration software, acquired a rival's 
competing freeware program and then raised the price of its own 
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commercial program, while effectively removing the freeware from the 
market by ceasing to update it.  The plaintiffs alleged that the acquisition 
permitted Adobe to raise its own product price while restraining innovation 
in the market for graphics design software. 
 
KLOTH V. MICROSOFT CORP. 
444 F.3d 312 (4
th
 Cir. 2006) 
Niemeyer, Circuit Judge: 
 
This appeal, a part of the multidistrict class action antitrust litigation 
brought against Microsoft Corporation by 39 purchasers of Microsoft's 
operating system software and applications software, presents the question 
whether 26 indirect purchasers have stated a claim upon which relief can be 
granted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The district court granted Microsoft's 
motion to dismiss their claims…. The court … found that they lacked 
standing to seek recovery for certain types of injury because the alleged 
injury did not constitute “antitrust injury,” was speculative, or was 
generalized and not specific to the plaintiffs. The court dismissed the 
plaintiffs' equitable claims under the doctrine of laches.  For the reasons that 
follow, we affirm. 
 
In the aftermath of the United States' suit against Microsoft, in 
which Microsoft was found to have maintained an illegal monopoly in the 
worldwide market for licensing Intel-compatible PC operating systems, see 
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C.Cir.2001), numerous 
class action suits were filed against Microsoft in courts across the country. 
On April 25, 2000, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred 
the cases that were pending in federal district courts to the District of 
Maryland, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407. Thereafter, 39 plaintiffs filed a 
superseding consolidated amended complaint, seeking damages and 
equitable relief under the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 
 
In their 66-page consolidated amended complaint, the plaintiffs 
allege that beginning in the late 1980s, when Microsoft's market share in the 
United States for operating system software was 95 percent, Microsoft 
engaged in a series of predatory acts that were designed to, and did, 
eliminate competition and prevent entry into the operating system software 
market. They allege that since 1994, when Digital Research, Inc. and IBM 
were eliminated as meaningful competitors, Microsoft has had no 
significant competitor in the operating systems software market. They assert 
that Microsoft used this monopoly power to raise prices and to leverage its 
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power into other markets, including markets for applications software such 
as word processing, spreadsheet, and office suite software, with the result 
that Microsoft has dominated these applications software markets since the 
mid-1990s, achieving market shares approaching 90 percent. Thus, for the 
time periods material to the complaint, the plaintiffs contend that Microsoft 
has had monopoly power in four product markets: (1) The licensing of 
Intel-compatible personal computer operating systems software; (2) the 
licensing of Intel-compatible personal computer word processing 
applications software; (3) the licensing of Intel-compatible personal 
computer spreadsheet applications software; and (4) the licensing of Intel-
compatible personal computer office suite applications software. 
 
The plaintiffs allege that Microsoft maintained and advanced its 
monopoly power by refusing to sell its software to manufacturers, retailers, 
and consumers. Instead, they allege, Microsoft employed a two-tier 
licensing system. It used one type of license for transactions with “original 
equipment manufacturers” (“OEMs”), allowing them to preinstall software 
on personal computers, which they in turn sold to consumers or “end-
users.” The plaintiffs claim that Microsoft was able to require OEMs to 
accept the terms of Microsoft's licensing agreement, forcing the OEMs to 
preinstall Microsoft operating systems on personal computers they sell and 
to act as Microsoft's agents in offering a second type of license, called “end-
user license agreements” (“EULAs”), for acceptance or rejection by 
consumers under terms dictated by Microsoft. To use Microsoft software, 
the end-users were required to agree to the EULAs, which provided, among 
other things, a Microsoft-funded refund to the end-user if the end-user 
declined to enter into the EULA. The EULAs imposed significant 
restrictions on use of the software by the licensee, giving Microsoft 
remedies against the end-user for breach of the license agreement. The 
complaint alleges in a similar manner that Microsoft dictated the terms and 
conditions under which distributors and retailers were able to sell EULAs. 
 
The plaintiffs claim that under this two-tier licensing regime, most 
consumers did not purchase software licenses directly from Microsoft. 
Rather, they bought computers from OEMs or retailers with pre-installed 
software that incorporated Microsoft's offer to issue the end-user a license 
agreement. The 26 plaintiffs who have appealed here are typical of those 
who purchased computers from OEMs or retailers with preinstalled 
software. 
 
The plaintiffs allege that Microsoft's exclusionary and restrictive 
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practices caused them injury by charging them “supra-competitive” prices 
for operating systems software and applications software, by denying them 
the benefit of new and superior technologies, and by preventing them from 
reselling Microsoft software products. They also claim that by integrating 
its Internet Explorer web browser with its operating system, Microsoft 
deprived them of alternative Internet search engines, degraded the 
performance of their computers, and made their computers more susceptible 
to security breaches. In short, they allege that as end-users, they paid 
“supra-competitive” prices for software and were deprived of the benefits of 
competition including, but not limited to, technological innovation, market 
choice, product variety, and substitutable supply. They request equitable 
relief, treble damages, attorneys fees, and costs…. 
 
… the plaintiffs claim that Microsoft's integration of Internet Explorer 
and Windows caused them direct injury because it resulted in performance 
degradation of their computers. This claim either mirrors the assertion that 
Microsoft suppressed superior technologies or seeks recovery for injuries 
that are not antitrust injuries. If Microsoft developed inferior technology, it 
essentially overcharged intermediaries for the value of its products, as 
measured by the price it would have obtained in a competitive market. Such 
injury is no different in principle from the restrictions on end-user licenses 
and the suppression of substitute technologies. All are essentially claims for 
illegal overcharges passed on to consumers. And to the extent that 
Microsoft's software degraded the performance of plaintiffs' computers, 
then any such damage would not form the basis of a claim for antitrust 
injury but a claim for some type of product liability injury. Presumably 
plaintiffs could make that claim just as they could for any other product 
liability claim….. 
 
In addition to claiming injury based on the allegation that Microsoft 
charged supra-competitive prices…  plaintiffs claim … other types of 
injury. They have alleged that (1) they were deprived of the benefits of 
competitive technology; (2) they sustained injury from restrictions imposed 
in the EULAs prohibiting them from reselling Microsoft software in a 
secondary or “used” market; and (3) their computers were degraded by the 
integration of the Internet Explorer web browser with the Windows 
operating system. 
 
 …  To have § 4 standing, the plaintiffs must demonstrate direct 
antitrust-type injury, not simply any injury that was caused by an antitrust 
violation. “Congress did not intend to allow every person tangentially 
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affected by an antitrust violation to maintain an action to recover threefold 
damages for injury to his business or property.” Associated General 
Contractors, 459 U.S. at 535. To determine whether a person has sustained 
direct antitrust-type injury to his business or property, a court must consider 
the five factors identified in Associated General Contractors: (1) the causal 
connection between an antitrust violation and harm to the plaintiffs, and 
whether that harm was intended; (2) whether the harm “was of a type that 
Congress sought to redress in providing a private remedy for violations of 
the antitrust laws”; (3) the directness of the alleged injury; (4) “the 
existence of more direct victims” of the alleged antitrust injury; and (5) 
“problems of identifying damages and apportioning them” among those 
directly and indirectly harmed. 
 
When considering the three types of injury that plaintiffs claim to have 
sustained directly-injuries other than supra-competitive prices-we conclude, 
by applying the Associated General Contractors factors, that plaintiffs' 
injuries were too generalized or speculative; that some injuries were not of 
the type covered by the antitrust law; that there were more direct victims; 
and that plaintiffs' claims raise insuperable problems in measuring and 
allocating damages….. 
 
 First, with respect to plaintiffs' claims that Microsoft deprived 
consumers of competitive technology, we agree with the conclusions 
reached by the district court. The court observed, “It would be entirely 
speculative and beyond the competence of a judicial proceeding to create in 
hindsight a technological universe that never came into existence.” The 
court continued, “It would be even more speculative to determine the 
relevant benefits and detriments that non-Microsoft products would have 
brought to the market and the relative monetary value ... to a diffuse 
population of end users.” Id. While plaintiffs assert that they should be 
given discovery with respect to these issues, it is readily apparent that 
discovery would not change or inform the nature of the alleged injuries. As 
the district court stated, 
 
The underlying reason that plaintiffs lack standing is that, to the 
extent they are seeking damages ... for the denial of the benefit of 
technologically superior products, it is merely coincidental that they 
purchased Microsoft products at all. They occupy a position no 
different from any other end user of computer products who never 
purchased any Microsoft software or EULAs. 
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At bottom, the harms that the plaintiffs have alleged with respect to the 
loss of competitive technologies are so diffuse that they could not possibly 
be adequately measured. The problem is not one of discovery and specific 
evidence, but of the nature of the injury claimed. Where the purported 
injuries amount to generalized or abstract societal harms, the plaintiffs 
cannot claim that they, as distinct from others in society, were specifically 
injured in their business or property by the alleged antitrust violation, as 
required by § 4. 
 
With respect to plaintiffs' alleged injury from Microsoft's restrictions on 
end-users in the EULAs, the plaintiffs lack standing because there are more 
direct victims-i.e., the retailers and OEMs-and because it is too costly for 
courts to discern the allocation of such damages….. 
 
… The plaintiffs also claim that the integration of Windows and the 
Internet Explorer web browser resulted in specific harms to their computers 
including “loss of speed and memory ... loss of operating system stability 
and increased susceptibility to viruses or security breaches.” To the extent 
that these claims are for actual injury to plaintiffs' computers, the plaintiffs' 
claims amount to claims for defective products. This type of injury is 
simply not a type for which plaintiffs can recover under the antitrust law. 
See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 
(1977). Rather, it sounds more in the nature of injury from a breach of 
warranty or other product liability. And plaintiffs do not assert that 
Microsoft intended to cause this harm to plaintiffs' computers or that 
Microsoft's purpose for inflicting this injury was aimed at lessening 
competition. As the district court observed, “the degradation of computer 
performance alleged by plaintiffs is only incidentally related to the alleged 
anti-competitive behavior.” In re Microsoft, 127 F.Supp.2d at 712. 
 
In short, we agree with the district court that … plaintiffs have failed to 
demonstrate that they have sustained direct antitrust-type injury, as required 
by § 4 of the Clayton Act and Associated General Contractors. 
 
Finally, we address whether the district court abused its discretion in 
dismissing plaintiffs' claims for injunctive relief under the doctrine of 
laches. See White v. Daniel, 909 F.2d 99, 102 (4th Cir.1990) (“[T]he 
equitable balancing of a plaintiff's delay with prejudice to a defendant is 
primarily left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we may not 
reverse unless it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of discretion 
”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added). In dismissing the 
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plaintiffs' claims for equitable relief, the district court concluded that the 
plaintiffs failed to pursue their injunctive claims with diligence and that 
their failure prejudiced Microsoft. See Giddens v. Isbrandtsen Co., 355 F.2d 
125, 127 (4th Cir.1966) (noting that laches may be applied when a plaintiff 
fails to pursue his claim with diligence, causing prejudice to the opposing 
party). 
 
The plaintiffs argue that they did not pursue their equitable claims 
because they were involved in class action settlement proceedings. They 
suggest that it would have made no sense to press their claims until those 
proceedings were resolved. In addition, the plaintiffs assert that Microsoft 
had notice of the nature of their claims for injunctive relief and suffered no 
prejudice in the form of “unfair surprise or inability to prepare its defense.” 
 
In response, Microsoft argues that plaintiffs filed only a generalized 
claim requesting injunctive relief in 2000 but waited more than four years 
before articulating the nature of the injunctive relief that they were seeking. 
Microsoft contends that this delay made it impossible for it to coordinate 
any consideration of remedies with the litigation in the United States' action 
against Microsoft then pending before Judge Kollar-Kotelly in the District 
of Columbia District Court. Microsoft argues that if the equitable claims 
had not been dismissed, a second round of litigation over the market effects 
of the proposed consent decree in the United States' action would have been 
required. 
 
Accepting Microsoft's arguments, the district court stated that it was 
“perfectly clear ... that the plaintiffs in the consolidated amended complaint 
were not pursuing injunctive claims with diligence. The focus was on 
monetary damages.” The court also relied on the fact that the inability to 
coordinate with the United States' action caused prejudice because the 
simultaneous proceedings would have “reshape[d] the competitive 
landscape.” Finally, the court noted that despite years of litigation, the 
plaintiffs had only recently specified the nature of their request for equitable 
relief and that they were using the initial “vague claim” for equitable relief 
as “a vessel for, essentially, asserting new claims.” Permitting that result 
would, in the district court's judgment, be “contrary to the public interest.” 
 
In the circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court 
did not abuse its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches to dismiss 
plaintiffs' equitable claims. 
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AFFIRMED. 
 
NOTES AND QUESTIONS 
 
1.  As the Kloth decision suggests, when the plaintiff’s alleged harm 
includes foreclosure of nascent products or technologies it is almost 
impossible for the plaintiff to show that the new product or technology 
would have come to fruition and would have been commercially successful 
but for the restraint.  This makes proof of causation, harm, and damages 
extremely difficult.  By contrast, as the preceding Allied Tube decision 
suggests, this standard is much more easily satisfied if the product has 
already been developed and is ready to be marketed.  For this reason and 
many others, antitrust often falls short of optimal protection for consumers.  
See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 
VAND.L.REV. 675 (2010). 
2.  In the 1960s the Government brought an antitrust action alleging that the 
major automobile manufacturers in the United States had conspired with 
each other to slow down investment in the development of air pollution 
control equipment for automobiles.  Specifically, the government claimed 
that the defendants conspired “to eliminate competition in the research, 
development, manufacture and installation of motor vehicle air pollution 
control equipment, and in the purchase from others of patents and patent 
rights, covering such equipment.”  The case ended in a consent decree, to 
which a number of local governments rigorously objected.  As the County 
of Los Angeles wrote: 
 
The County of Los Angeles and the [California] Air Pollution 
Control District have been actively engaged in the control of air 
pollution for over two decades. The Air Pollution Control Law of 
1947 adopted by the California Legislature recognized and used 
throughout the nation as a model for effective air pollution control 
regulations…. 
Los Angeles County, with its low wind velocities and 
frequent temperature inversions, is especially susceptible to air 
pollution. Emissions of air contaminants from stationery sources are 
INNOVATION AND COMPETITION POLICY                                 Chapter 6, Page 22 
Hovenkamp                                                                                                      Dec. 2012 
 
strictly controlled by law; but each day motor vehicles discharge 
12,000 tons of hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide, oxides of nitrogen, 
and other contaminants into the air of the Los Angeles Basin. 
The fact that emissions from motor vehicles pollute the air 
has been known for many years. In the early 1950's the automobile 
was clearly identified by scientists as the primary cause of the 
typical Los Angeles photochemical “smog.” 
These matters were known to the automobile manufacturers, 
and County officials regularly informed them and communicated 
with them. The manufacturers neither recognized that they had any 
responsibility for developing air pollution control devices nor did 
they make any substantial effort to develop them. 
In 1953, the manufacturers entered into the agreements 
which constituted the alleged combination in restraint of trade. In 
1955 the cross-licensing and “most favored purchaser” agreements 
were made. No devices were produced…. 
Amicus Brief of the County of Los Angeles, United States v. Auto. Mfgs. 
Ass’n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal 1969), appeal dismissed sub nom. City 
of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).  
However, the restraint involved equipment that was never 
developed.  Subsequent private actions ran aground for largely the same 
reasons as given in the principal case.  See In re Motor Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Equip., 481 F.2d 122 (9
th
 Cir. 1973).   See also Ford 
Motor Co. v. Lane, 86 F. Supp. 2d 711 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying antitrust 
standing on plaintiff’s claim that Ford had the capacity to build more 
efficient, lower emission vehicles but failed to do so as a result of a 
conspiracy with other automakers; in denying standing, court concluded 
that plaintiff’s true injury resulted from the fact that he had to purchase 
more gasoline than he would have had to purchase if his engine had been 
more efficient, and that Ford did not operate in the gasoline market).  Cf. 
Ass’n of Washington Pub. Hosp. Dists. v. Philip Morris, 241 F.3d 696 (9th 
Cir. 2001) (hospitals lacked standing to sue cigarette companies on claim 
that latter conspired to restrain development of safer cigarettes). 
